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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping, a first
degree felony. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury on February 20,
2007. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence often years to life at the
Utah State Prison. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under the
pour over provision in U.C.A. §78-2a-3(j).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD
ACTS?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard of review. "When reviewing a trial court's decision to
admit evidence under Rule 404(b), we apply an abuse of discretion standard."
State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001). In addition, this court should
"review the record to determine whether the admission of [prior] bad acts
evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in the proper exercise
of that discretion.5"

State v. Nelson-Wagonner, 6 P.3d 1120 (Utah

2000)(citations omitted). This issue was preserved for appeal when Defendant
filed a motion to exclude the evidence. (R. 646-52).
II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DIDN'T
RECOMMEND THAT DEFENDANT BE GIVEN
CREDIT FOR TIME HE HAD SERVED?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This issue presents a question of law which

this Court should review for correctness. "Because sentencing errors involve
questions of law, we review for correctness." State v. Samora, 2002 UT App
384, f 7. This issue was not preserved for appeal. However, the sentence on
remand violated Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and
therefore this issue can be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. ^ 13.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§76-5-302. Aggravated kidnapping.
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping:
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601; or
(b) acts with intent:
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from
engaging in particular conduct;
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after
commission or attempted commission of a felony;
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony;
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political
function; or
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4,
Sexual Offenses.
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention
or kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of:
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention.
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of
imprisonment of:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15
years and which may be for life;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the
trier of fact finds that during the course of the commission of the aggravated
kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the
commission of the aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously
convicted of a grievous sexual offense.
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court
finds that a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in
the interests of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the
court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
i

(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and w Inch may be toi life; or
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b):
(i) ten years arid which may be for life; or
(ii) six years and which may be for life.
(5) The provisions of Subsection (-]) »|M not apph WIUMI I person is
sentenced under Subsection (3)(c).
(6) imprisonment under this section is mandator) in accordance with
Section 76-3-406.
§76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence set
aside.
(1) Where a com iction or sentence has been set aside on direct rex lew or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense
or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than
the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence pre\ ioush satisfied.
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which weie not known to the
court at the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places on
the record the facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence; or
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and later
successfully moves to invalidate his conviction in which case the defendant
and the prosecution stand in the same position as though the plea bargain,
com iction, and sentence had never occurred.
§78-2a- 3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) 1 he I ourt ot Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction oi
interlocutor}7 appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting trom iormal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission. State Tax Commission. School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board uf Trustees, Division of Forestry Fire and State
Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources, Board of Oil Gas. and Mining, and the state
engineer;
(j) cases transferred to the I ourt oi Vppeals trom the Supreme L ourt.

A

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 403- Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or
waste of time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged with Aggravated Kidnapping in violation of
U.C.A. 76-5-302, a first degree felony for an incident that occurred on or about
January 2, 2001. (R. 001). The Defendant represented himself at a jury trial and
was convicted on October 4, 2002, of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping, a
first degree felony. The Defendant was sentenced to a term often years to life
at the Utah State Prison. The sentence was ordered to run consecutive to
another prison sentence. The trial court also recommended that he receive
credit for the time he had served up to that point. (R. 449-50, 901/8-10)
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The Defendant filed an appeal of his conviction.
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February 20 % 2007.

The Defendant was convicted a second time of the offense of Aggravated
Kidnapping, a first degree felony. The Defendant was sentenced on April 4,
2007. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term often years to lire ai the
V.idh Siaic Vv^oii. i lie sentence was to run consecutive to a previous Alienee.
The lnal I-MJII did n<»t ei\e him <'ivdit IMI- finie sen ed this time

(R
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902/20)
The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on April 6, 2007.
The Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal on April 18. 200".

'R. 881).

Counsel also filed a notice of appeal that was date stamped on Ma} e 20o,;\
(R. 883)

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 2, 2001, Jeanette Nicole Sather ("Nicole") was an
acquaintance of the Defendant. (R. 466/258). They had been introduced by a
friend of hers who had been in prison. (R. 466/258-59). In December of 1999,
Nicole sent the Defendant, who was an inmate at the prison, a birthday card.
(R. 466/259). The two of them began writing to each other. In the summer of
2000, the Defendant began receiving home visits. Nicole would go visit him
on the weekends while the Defendant was at home. (R. 466/261).
Nicole believed the Defendant was the man of her dreams. (R. 466/262).
In September of 2000 the Defendant was released from the prison.

(R.

466/263). The two of them became involved in a serious relationship. (R.
466/263). By November of 2000, the relationship had soured and Nicole was
trying to figure out a way to get out of the relationship. (R. 466/264). Nicole
testified that the Defendant was too controlling and domineering for her. (R.
466/265).
The Defendant began dating someone else; but he would still call and
leave messages on Nicole's voice mail, and she would return the calls. (R.
466/265). Around Christmas of 2000, the Defendant called Nicole and told her
that people were coming to kill her. (R. 466/267). On January 2, 2001, Nicole

ended her shift as the general manager at Nickelcade at around midnight. (R.
466/269). She got in her car and drove home. (R. 466/273).
Shortly after she arrived home she heard a knock at her door.
466/276).

(R.

She looked out the window and noticed the Defendant's truck

parked in the street. (R. 466/277).

She went to the door and while the door

was locked, she had a conversation with the Defendant through the locked
door. (R. 467/5-6). Nicole told him to leave because their relationship was
over.

He told her that he just needed to get his rings. (R. 467/6).

She

eventually opened the door and let the Defendant inside her home. She asked
if anyone was with him, and the Defendant said they were alone. (R. 467/6).
After the Defendant was inside there was another knock on the door.
Nicole told the Defendant not to answer the door, but he did anyway. The
Defendant's cousin, Justin Pedockie, was at the door.

(R. 467/7). Justin

walked into the kitchen and disconnected Nicole's phones and caller I.D.
Nicole went into her bedroom and retrieved the Defendant's rings.

(R.

467/11). She told the Defendant another ring was in her car. She went outside
to her car to get the last ring. (R. 467/14).
She climbed inside her car and retrieved the ring as well as a pocketknife
that she kept in her car. (R. 467/14-15). She gave the Defendant his ring and

told him to go. He told her that she was going to go on a ride with them. She
told him that if he wanted to go for a ride, they'd go in her car. (R. 467/16).
Defendant told her they were going in his truck and then motioned to
Justin. Justin exited the truck and he was carrying a "big black gun" with a
banana clip. (R. 467/16). The Defendant told her she was going to go for a ride
with them or they'd shoot her right there. (R. 467/18). Nicole got in the truck
with Justin and the Defendant. She was seated in the middle of the two men.
(R. 467/18-19). Justin put the gun on his right side between his body and the
door. (R. 467/19).
The Defendant drove to 1-15 and got on the freeway heading
southbound. They drove to Payson. (R. 467/20). During the drive, Nicole
asked where they were going. The Defendant told her she was going to her
grave. (R. 467/22). Along the way, the stopped at a Chevron in Lehi to get
gas. (R. 467/24-26). They eventually returned to the freeway and drove to
Payson.

(R. 467/34). They drove to a farm where the Defendant had

previously taken Nicole to ride horses. (R. 467/34). The farm was owned by
the Defendant's girlfriend's parents. Her name was Karen; and at the time of
the trial, she and the Defendant had apparently married. (R. 467/37).
They parked the truck and Nicole remained sitting inside it. Justin was
outside at the front of the truck with the gun. The Defendant was standing

Q

outside near the driver's door. Nicole scooted over to the door. She testified
that she kicked the Defendant and then pulled the door shut. She started the
truck and put it in gear and began to pull forward. The Defendant opened the
door from the outside as Nicole was trying to hold it closed. (R. 467/39-40).
Nicole testified that as soon as she pushed on the gas she heard a
gunshot and the truck instantaneously stopped. (R. 467/42). She believed that
Justin had fired the gun. Defendant opened the truck door and climbed inside.
(R. 467/42). The Defendant put the truck in park and then ran around outside
the truck. (R. 467/42). Nicole reached inside the glove box and grabbed a cell
phone. Before she could call anyone the Defendant came back into the truck,
jumped on top of her and started choking her. (R. 467/43).
Justin opened the door and said "somebody had to have heard that, let's
get out of here." (R. 467/44). The Defendant let go of Nicole and they drove
away. The Defendant drove to Karen's trailer and went inside the trailer for a
short time. (R. 467/45). When he came out of the trailer Karen was with him.
(R. 467/53). The Defendant told Justin that they had an alibi, and that Karen
was going to say that they had been with her that night. (R. 467/55).
After they left Karen's, the Defendant got back on 1-15 and started
driving northbound towards Salt Lake. (R. 467/57). The Defendant drove to

West Valley where he dropped Justin off at his house. (R. 467/59-61). Justin
took his gun and went inside. (R. 467/61).
After they dropped Justin off, Nicole asked if she could drive because
she was concerned with the Defendant's alcohol consumption. The Defendant
agreed to let her drive. (R. 467/64). She drove back to her house in Ogden and
parked in her driveway. (R. 467/72). The Defendant grabbed a bag out of the
back of the truck and then followed Nicole into her house. (R. 467/73). The
Defendant put Nicole's phones on top of the bag when he took it into her
house. (R. 467/76).
Nicole sat on the couch and the Defendant lay on top of her.

(R.

467/77). The Defendant passed out, and Nicole fell asleep. (R. 467/78). The
next thing Nicole remembered was her alarm going off. The Defendant had
rolled off of her so she got up and turned her alarm off. (R. 467/78). The
Defendant remained asleep on the couch for another fifteen or twenty minutes.
(R. 467/79).
Nicole noticed the phone so she plugged it in and called a couple of her
assistant managers to see if she could find someone to cover her shift at work.
(R. 467/79). She also called some of her friends. One of her friends asked if
she should call the police. Nicole told her no that she would wind up dead if
the police were called. (R. 467/81). Nicole was asked by the prosecutor why
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she didn't want the police called. She testified that at the time she was hanging
out with the wrong crowd. People who were in and out of prison "and I knew
what they did to people who called the police, so I was scared. I didn't want
him to get caught. I wanted him just to go away." (R. 467/81-82).
After she hung up the phone, the Defendant walked into the kitchen and
asked her if she called the police on him. (R. 467/82). The prosecutor asked
Nicole if she was afraid of retaliation if she called the police. Nicole answered,
"Yeah. He was in a gang in prison, and I hung out with prior to this with quite
a few of the other people that were in the prison and I knew, you know, what
they were all capable of doing and what they did to what they call snitches at
the time." (R. 467/82).
After the phone call, the Defendant had Nicole go into her room. He
pulled his penis out and told her to suck it. (R. 467/83). At the same time the
phone rang so she went to answer the phone. The Defendant followed her. It
was her friend on the phone. Nicole told her she couldn't talk. (R. 467/83).
After Nicole hung up the phone, the Defendant made Nicole take her
clothes off. He then made her turn around and explain what every bruise on
her body was from. She told him that she got them from work. (R. 467/84).
The phone rang again. Nicole answered it and it was her friend's mother,

Sherrie Norris. (R. 467/85-6). The Defendant plugged in another phone and
listened in on the conversation. (R. 467/86).
After the conversation with Sherrie Norris ended the Defendant took
Nicole into her room and told her to get dressed. Nicole asked him to please
go. He wouldn't leave without her. (R. 467/88). After Nicole was dressed they
went outside to his truck. Nicole noticed Sherrie Norris driving by. Nicole
motioned with her hand for her to keep driving. (R. 467/89).
Nicole started walking down the sidewalk away from her house. The
Defendant began yelling at her to come back. When she didn't go back he told
her he was going to run into her car. (R. 467/91). Nicole turned and walked
back to the Defendant's truck. (R. 467/91). When Nicole got back to the
truck, the Defendant handed her his cell phone and told her Zach Leifson was
on the phone. Nicole had met Zach on one prior occasion. She testified that
Zach was one of the Defendant's "gang member brother, partners, friends."
(R. 467/92). She asked Zach to tell the Defendant to leave her alone. (R.
467/92). The Defendant took the phone back from her. (R. 467/93)
They drove to Weber Canyon and then traveled east through Morgan
County. (R. 467/95). While they were traveling, Nicole called another coworker to make sure her shift was covered because she was "terrified that I'd
lose my job." (R. 467/96). While she was on the phone with her co-worker,

the Defendant pulled out her pocketknife and told her if she did anything stupid
she was going to get it. (R. 467/97). They also had a conversation where the
Defendant told her he had a dream where he was going to kill her and then
himself, and that's what he was going to do. (R. 467/101).
The Defendant was running low on gas so he pulled into a gas station at
Silver Creek Junction. (R. 467/99). Nicole told him that she needed to go to
the bathroom. (R. 467/99). The Defendant made her promise she would return
to the truck. When the truck stopped she opened the door and walked into the
gas station. (R. 467/100). She walked into the bathroom and stayed in there
for ten to fifteen minutes. (R. 467/100). She eventually walked out of the
bathroom. The Defendant was standing by the counter. He approached her
and said, "Come on, let's go." (R. 467/102). She said "okay" and he turned to
walk out the door. She noticed that there were some steps and she ran up the
steps as fast as she could go. (R. 467/103).
There were some showers up the stairs, and Nicole hid in one of the
showers. (R. 467/105). She was in the shower for approximately twenty
minutes before she came out. (R. 467/106). She looked out a window and
noticed the Defendant's truck pulling into one of the parking stalls.

(R.

467/108-9). She ran back into the shower and stayed there another twenty

minutes. (R. 467/109). She looked out the window again and noticed the
Defendant's truck driving away. (R. 467/109-10).
She came down the stairs and was told by someone working at the
counter that he was gone. She started bawling and then began calling friends.
(R. 467/110). Eventually the police were called and someone picked up Nicole
and took her to the Summit County Sheriffs Office. (R. 467/111-13). Nicole
was questioned at the sheriffs office. She didn't want the Defendant caught so
she spelled his name wrong.

She didn't tell them anything about Justin

Pedockie's involvement. (R. 467/113).
There were pictures taken of Nicole at the sheriffs office.

She had

scratches on her neck and a mark above her eye. (R. 467/115). A friend
picked her up from the sheriffs office and drove her back to Ogden. (R.
467/117). The next day Nicole obtained a protective order. She was told by a
judge that he wouldn't sign it unless she talked to someone at the Ogden Police
Department, which she eventually did. About a week after that she talked to
Detective Hansen from the police department. (R. 467/117-20).
She was asked to fill out a written statement which she decided against
doing. (R. 467/120). She eventually talked to Detective Hansen about what
happened and agreed to give a written statement. (R. 467/121).

Zach Leifson testified for the State. He knew the Defendant from prison
where they were cellmates. (R. 467/209). Zach had talked to the Defendant on
the phone during the time Defendant had Nicole. The Defendant told Zach that
he had Nicole and it had gone wrong and asked what he should do. Zach told
him to let her go and she wouldn't call the police. (R. 467/217). Zach also
talked to Nicole. Zach testified that Nicole sounded scared, and she had said,
"he's going to kill me. They tried to kill me. Help me." (R. 467/218). Zach
told her to tell the Defendant that if he would let her go she wouldn't call the
police. Zach testified that he thought this was good advice because if she
called the police it would become "a whole gang situation." (R. 467/218-220).
After Nicole had gotten away, the Defendant called Zach and told him
he had some stuff he needed to get rid of. (R. 467/223). About an hour later
the Defendant arrived at Zach's residence in Pay son. The Defendant had a pair
of shoes, a phone, a pocket knife and a beanie that he wanted to get rid of. (R.
467/226). The Defendant then drove Zach out to Zach's in-laws farm. The
Defendant told Zach that he and Justin had taken Nicole out there to shoot her
and they were going to drop her in the well and she tried to get away. (R.
467/234-6).
About a month later Zach called the Ogden Police Department and
reported what the Defendant had told him.

(R. 467/245).

He met with

Detective Hanson and gave a recorded statement. (R. 467/245-8). After Zach
gave Detective Hanson the statement he decided to not cooperate with the
State. He testified that this was the result of threats made against him. (R.
467/248).
Zach testified that Karen (the Defendant's wife) and Kami (Zach's exwife and Karen's sister) told him that if he testified he'd die. (R. 467/249).
These statements were objected to by defense counsel, but overruled.

(R.

467/248). Zach testified that he was worried because of "the gang." (R.
467/250).
Prior to the first trial Zach had been telling people that he wasn't going
to testify. Karen had him sign a notarized statement that she said would get
him out of testifying. (R. 467/254). Zach testified that he didn't write or read
the statement. He testified that he just signed it. The statement read that he was
threatened by the prosecutor that he would go back to prison if he didn't
cooperate. The statement also says that he originally gave a false statement
because he did not want to go back to prison. (R. 467/257). Zach testified that
he signed the statement so the threats would go away. The first time he read
the statement was at the first trial when the Defendant presented it to him to
read. (R. 467/262-4).

After the State finished questioning Zach, the jurors were allowed to ask
questions. One of them asked Zach if he feared gang retaliation. He answered,
"yes." (R. 467/271).
Justin Pedockie also testified for the State. He testified that he and the
Defendant grew up together until the Defendant went to prison. He testified
that he was in on the plan to go to Ogden, kidnap Nicole, take her to Payson,
put her in a well and shoot her. (R. 469/21).
Justin was arrested and charged with Aggravated Kidnapping.

(R.

469/101). After he was arrested he gave a statement that they went to a hockey
game and then went to Karen's and spent the night. (R. 469/102). After the
preliminary hearing the State offered Justin a deal. They offered a plea bargain
if he would cooperate with the State. (R. 469/103). The deal that was offered
to Justin was that the first degree felony would be reduced to a class A
misdemeanor, and the prosecutor would recommend no jail time. (R. 469/10406).
As part of the deal, Justin had to make a statement to the detective. He
later approached the prosecutor and told her that the statement wasn't correct.
(R. 469/107). In the original statement Justin took most of the blame, and said
it was his idea, that he was the one who was going to kill her. (R. 469/108).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated. There
were several instances where the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
the State to introduce prejudicial evidence against the Defendant. The trial
court allowed the State's witnesses to testify about Defendant's prior history of
being in prison and being in a gang known for retaliation. This information
was extremely inflammatory and certainly prejudiced the jury as evidenced by
the questions to the witnesses as to whether they feared retaliation for
testifying.

This prior bad act evidence didn't help prove any of the non-

character elements envisioned by Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
and was only used to show that Defendant had a bad character and was acting
in conformity therewith.
When the trial court sentenced the Defendant the second time it didn't
give him credit for time served. The first time the Defendant was sentenced
the court gave him credit for time served. The second, more severe sentence,
violated the Defendant's due process rights by punishing him more severely
after he was successful in overturning his first conviction.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD
ACTS.
Prior to the trial, the Defendant filed a motion in limine. In the motion,

the Defendant moved the court for an order prohibiting the State from
discussing that Defendant had been in prison, had been on parole, was a
participant with the Soldiers of Aryan Culture, that he had a history of
domestic violence, or that he had solicited another person to threaten the
alleged victim. (R. 646).
The trial court did not issue written findings of fact and conclusions of
law on this issue.

The Court did rule from the bench and denied the

Defendant's motion. In its ruling the trial judge stated;
You know, normally evidence about him being in prison or on parole or
belonging to SAC would not be relevant, but in this case it just seems it
is because it explains how they met, why she was afraid of him, and I
just - I don't know how you try the case because of the relationship and
the setting in which they met and leave that out. It just - the jury is not
going to have a correct picture of the relationship and what went on here.
So I'm going to deny the motion in limine.
It just seems to me it's being offered to explain how they were together,
how they met, how they knew each other, what the relationship was,
then it becomes extremely relevant in trying to figure out what she did,
what he did, and why they reacted the way they did during the course of
the kidnapping or the alleged kidnapping here. It also explains why she

was afraid of the defendant, why she was afraid to call the police. And,
again, it does seem to be relevant in this particular case. (R. 898/26-27)
The State was allowed to introduce prior bad act evidence against the
Defendant, and it became a central theme to the State's case.

From the

beginning of Nicole's testimony it was emphasized that Defendant was in
prison when they met. (R. 467/58-63). She also testified that she was hanging
out with people who were in and out of prison, and she knew "what they did to
people who called the police, so I was scared." (R. 467/81-82). Nicole was
asked if she feared retaliation. She answered; "Yeah. He was in a gang in
prison, and I hung out with prior to this quite a few of the other people that
were in the prison and I knew, you know, what they were all capable of doing
and what they did to what they call snitches at the time." (R. 467/82). Nicole
also testified that she contacted an individual named Casey Weaver.

She

contacted Mr. Weaver for advice because he was in the same gang as the
Defendant. (R. 467/206)
Zach Leifson was allowed to testify that he met the Defendant in prison
when they were cellmates. (R. 467/209). Zach testified that he told Nicole to
tell the Defendant that she wouldn't call the police. He thought this was good
advice because if she called the police it would become "a whole gang
situation." (R. 467/218-20). Zach testified that there was a time when he
wasn't going to cooperate with the State because Defendant's wife and Zach's
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ex-wife told him that if he testified he'd die. (R. 467/249). Zach testified that
he was worried because of "the gang." (R. 467/250).
Justin Pedockie testified that he grew up with the Defendant until the
Defendant went to prison. (R. 469/8). After Justin finished testifying the
jurors were allowed to submit questions and one of them asked Justin if he
feared gang retaliation. He answered, that he did. He followed that up with
"I—I don't fear it. I mean, I -I know that they want to, but I'm not afraid of
them, I guess you would say.

I don't care anymore."

(R. 469/195-96)

Defendant's attorney objected to the question and was apparently overruled at
a sidebar before the question was answered. (R. 469/195-98) Likewise, jurors
also submitted similar questions for Nicole and Zach.
Nicole was asked if she still felt threatened. She answered, "Yeah. I do a
lot of things to make sure that I'm safe all the time. (R. 468/233). Zach was
asked if he feared gang retaliation today. He answered, u Yes." (R. 467/271).
This prior bad act evidence as well as the retaliation speculation was
highly prejudicial to the Defendant. It only served to inflame the jury and show
that he has a bad character. In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987),
the Utah Supreme Court stated that "this Court has repeatedly held that
evidence of other crimes may not be admitted to prove that the defendant has a
bad character or a disposition to commit the crime charged." Id. at 1075.

Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets
the requirements of 402 and 403.U.R.E. 404(b)(2002).
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o give meaning to the policy
embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably
necessary and highly probative of a material issue." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d
at 1075.
The Defendant's prior bad acts didn't help show any of the noncharacter purposes envisioned by Rule 404(b). In State v. Featherson, 781
P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held that for prior bad acts to
be admissible at trial, there had to be "a special relevance to a controverted
issue and is introduced for a purpose other than to show the defendant's
predisposition to criminality." Id. at 426.
The fact that Defendant had been to prison and was in a gang had no
relevance to the charge of Aggravated Kidnapping.

The elements of

Aggravated Kidnapping as they were listed in the Information are that the
Defendant; intentionally or knowingly, without authority or law and against the
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will of the victim, Jeanette Sather, by any means and in any manner seized,
confined, detained, or transported the victim:
(a) and in committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight
after the attempt or commission of the kidnapping, the actor
possessed, used, or threatened to use a dangerous weapon as defined
in Utah Code § 76-1-601; and/or did intentionally aid, assist,
encourage, command, or solicit another to do the same. (R. 001).
The fact that Defendant was in prison when he and Nicole met nor the
fact that he was in a gang helped establish any of the elements of Aggravated
Kidnapping. The State didn't need that evidence to prove any of the elements
of the offense. How and where Nicole met the Defendant didn't assist the trier
of fact in any way other than to show that Defendant had a questionable
character. Furthermore, the fact that Defendant was in a gang was not relevant
and did not assist the State in proving any of the elements. The speculative
nature of retaliation was a constant theme that was extremely prejudicial to the
Defendant.
A.

ANY PROBATIVE VALUE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL
EFFECT

Even if evidence of other crimes has relevance beyond proving mere
criminal disposition, it is still subject to the protections of Rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The
1A

factors a court should consider when weighing the probative value of prior
conviction evidence against its prejudicial effect are "the similarities between
the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need
for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id.
The trial Court did not do a Rule 403 analysis. The Court failed to
address the similarities between the Defendant's bad acts, the interval of time
between the crimes, the need for the evidence and the effect the evidence
would have on the jury. Since the trial court failed to engage in a Rule 403
analysis, this Court should reverse Defendant's conviction.

B.

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO ADMIT
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS INTO EVIDENCE.

THE

In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained must "be
sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant in its absence." State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656
(Utah 1989). In State v. Cox, this Court stated that "[ajlthough the State
presented evidence on which might be sufficient to sustain a rape conviction,
we are nevertheless persuaded that the jury may have reached a different result
in the absence of the highly prejudicial evidence of the prior sexual assaults."
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 7.

Informing the jury that the Defendant had previously been to prison and
was a member of gang that was known to retaliate was highly prejudicial. If
the "taint" caused by inadmissible evidence is sufficient, "it is irrelevant that
there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a verdict." State v. Mitchell,
779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). Because the prior bad act evidence is so
highly prejudicial, the Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the
Defendant should receive a new trial.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DIDN'T
RECOMMEND THAT DEFENDANT BE GIVEN
CREDIT FOR THE TIME HE HAD SERVED.

Following Defendant's first conviction he was sentenced on February
12, 2003. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years to life at the
Utah State Prison. The court also ran the sentence consecutive to a sentence
the Defendant was already serving. (R. 901/8-10). The trial court also gave
the Defendant credit for the time served. (R. 901/10).
When the Defendant was re-sentenced following the reversal of his
conviction by this Court and his subsequent jury trial, the trial court again
imposed a ten year to life sentence to be run consecutive to the prior sentence.
However, during the second sentence the trial court did not give the Defendant
credit for the time served. This sentencing occurred on April 4, 2007. The
Court was asked by the clerk if there was credit for time served. The trial

judge specifically stated that there was to be no credit for time served. (R. 92/
20).

In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the Supreme Court

held that when resentencing a defendant, due process prevents the judge from
increasing the sentence

if the increased

sentence

is motivated

by

vindictiveness. In State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court discussed the requirements of due process and U.C. A. §76-3405.

The Utah Supreme Court held that this section prevents the Utah

constitutional right to appeal from being impaired "by imposing on a defendant
who demonstrates the error of his conviction the risk that he may be penalized
with a harsher sentence for having done so." Id. at 180.
U.C.A. §76-3-405 limits a defendant from receiving a harsher sentence
following a successful appeal. It reads;
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or
on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the
same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct
which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the
prior sentence previously satisfied.
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known
to the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court
affirmatively places on the record the facts which provide the
basis for the increased sentence.
The State attempted to get the trial court to sentence the Defendant to an
increased sentence of fifteen years to life. The prosecutor alleged that facts
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that were not known to the trial court at the time of sentencing would justify an
increased sentence. (R. 902/12-15). The trial court carefully considered those
factors and found that there was no new information that would justify an
increased sentence. (R. 902/16-20).
However, after making that specific finding, the trial court did impose a
sentence that was more sever than the first one. On February 12, 2003, when
the Defendant was initially sentenced, he was given credit for time served. (R.
901/10). On April 4, 2007, when the Defendant was sentenced the second time
the Court refused to grant credit for time served. (R. 902/20).
This resulted in a more severe sentence in two ways.

First, the

Defendant didn't receive credit for the time he was incarcerated waiting trial
and sentencing. Second, due to the time frames associated with the appeal and
second trial, over four years elapsed between the first and second sentences.
By not receiving credit for the time served, the Defendant served an additional
four years without credit for successfully winning the first appeal. Due process
and Utah's statutory prohibition prevent such a result. "In the context of the
due process requirement of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct
2072, which seeks to assure that there is no chilling or deterring of the criminal
defendant's exercise of his basic constitutional right to appeal, and in light of
the Utah constitutional constraint against impairing the right to appeal, . . . we

think the meaning of our statutory prohibition against a 'more severe' second
sentence is clear. The second sentence cannot exceed the first in appearance or
effect. . . ." State v. Samora, 2002 UT App 384 |11
Defendant's second sentence exceeded his first sentence. He did not
receive credit for the initial time he was in custody awaiting the first trial, and
then he lost an additional four years of credit as a result of his successful
appeal. Due process prohibits such a result. For these reasons, the Defendant
respectfully requests that if his conviction is upheld that the matter be
remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing.
CONCLUSION
The State used improper character evidence throughout the Defendant's
trial. This evidence was not relevant to any of the elements of Aggravated
Kidnapping and was only used to show that Defendant had a bad character and
acted in conformity therewith.

This evidence was highly prejudicial and

certainly could have impacted the jury's verdict. Based on these reasons, the
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and grant
him a new trial. In the alternative the Defendant asks this Court to remand the
matter back to the trial court to have the sentence amended so that he receive
credit for the time he has served.

DATED t h i s \ day of March 2008.
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HEARING
COUNT: 3:24
This is the time set for sentencing, scheduled one week early due
to the defendant submitting a written letter demanding to be
sentenced within 45 days. The defendant is present and represented
by Stephen Laker, public defender.
Brenda Beaton is present representing the State of Utah. It is
noted that the State filed a sentencing brief, and the defense has
not yet responded to the brief. Mr. Laker indicates that the
defendant does not wish for him to speak at sentencing.
The Court inquires as to whether the defendant wishes to be
sentenced today or allow the defense time to respond to the State's
brief. The defendant asserts that he desires to be sentenced today
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and does not wish to have a public defender. He further
requests transcripts of all hearings, which the Court denies at
this time, informing the defendant that he can request transcripts
once a formal appeal has been filed. The defendant is informed he
has 30 days from the date of sentencing to file
an appeal. The Court declines to release the Public Defender's
Association at this time, and this matter is passed so that Mr.
Laker can discuss the contents of the presentence investigation
report with the defendant.
COUNT: 3:37
Case is recalled. Attorney Beaton addresses the Court regarding
the defendant's right to counsel or right to represent himself at
sentencing. The defendant again asserts that he wishes to be
sentenced today, and indicates he believes his
constitutional rights were violated by his not being sentenced at
the time his conviction entered. Attorney Beaton addresses the
Court regarding the State's brief, and her argument that the Court
impose a greater sentence of 15 years to life than was
originally imposed. The Court denies the motion for a
fifteen-to-life sentence, and imposes a sentence of ten
years-to-life, to be served at the Utah State Prison. The sentence
shall run consecutively with the sentence the defendant is
currently serving
and credit for time previously served is denied by the Court. The
defendant: is further ordered uo pay full restitution in this case,
to be determined by the Board of Pardons.
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do any good and won't make any sense.

And, frankly, it would

be a miscarriage of justice in terms of trying to get a jury
to be impartial but to listen to the evidence and all of the
evidence fairly.

If they don't have it all to listen to then

we have no way of knowing what kind verdict they will give us
and we have no guarantee it will be just.
THE COURT:
MR. BARR:

All right.

Mr. Barr?

Can I just respond on a couple of things?

I think that's what the essence of what she's saying is we
need to have this evidence so the jury knows who he is,
that's what the character evidence is.

That's the very

purpose she wants to get it in there is character evidence,
not because there's some motive or intent there.
I think the other thing is —

and what he's telling me

regarding that other person and I don't know if we have to
have another hearing regarding that, but it seems he says
that this incident regarding the shooting of another man
happened back in 1992.

And it wasn't that he shot the girl

or threatened the girl, which is what this case is about.
And he also said it wasn't because it was a jealousy thing,
it was a drug incident which is totally unrelated to what
this case is about.
should —

So even if that's all so, then that

has no relationship at all to what this case is

about.
THE COURT:

All right.

You know, normally evidence
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aboat him being in prison or on parole or belonging to SAC
would not be relevant, but in this case it just seems it is
because it explains how they met, why she was afraid of him,
and I just —

1 don't know how you try the case because of

the relationship and the setting in which they met and leave
that out.

It just -- the jury is not going to have a correct

picture of the relationship and what went on here.

So I'm

going to deny the motion in limine.
It just seems to me it it's being offered to explain how
they were together, how they met, how they knew each other,
what the relationship was, then it becomes extremely relevant
in trying to figure out what she did, what he did, and why
they reacted the way they did during the course of the
kidnapping or the alleged kidnapping here.

It also explains

why she was afraid of the defendant, why she was afraid to
call the police.

And, again, it does seem to be relevant in

this particular case.
On the question of the prior shooting, again, it goes to
her knowledge and her mindset and how she felt about the
defendant and why she was afraid and why she took his threats
seriously when he said he was going to kill her because she
knew about an earlier incident.
was 1992.

It doesn't matter whether it

Her understanding was that he had tried to kill

somebody else with a firearm and there are some real
similarities between thau incident and what happened in this
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case.

So, again, I think it becomes relevant because it

shows what's going on in her mind and her response to what
he's doing.
And finally, on the question of Paul Bushell, it seems to
me that that is his testimony about being solicited by the
defendant to threaten the victim, again, becomes relevant.
And as I understand it, the defense is really not objecting
to that as long as Mr. Bushell is here to testify.
All right.

Anything else on that motion that I need to

address or clarify?
MR. BARR:

I guess —

Your Honor, I was trying to

listen to you, honestly, and he's whispering.
THE COURT:
MR. BARR:

I know.

I know.

And I guess what he was whispering to me

while you were talking is regarding the incident back 1992,
he says his conviction was for possession of a firearm by a
restricted person.

He did not get convicted of shooting this

guy, it was aggravated or assault or anything like that,
because it was a self-defense issue, it was regarding that he
had a weapon.
THE COURT:

It's not the conviction that is

critical.

What is critical here is what she believed

happened.

And what she's saying is, hey, he went after

somebody else with a shotgun and it had to do with a
relationship with his girlfriend or ex-wife or whatever, and
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Let's see.

This is State of Utah versus

Robert Pedockie, case ending in 0689.

And this is the time

for sentencing on the charge of aggravated kidnapping.
And, let's see, Ms. Neider, you're here on behalf of the
State?
MS. NEIDER:
THE COURT:

I am, Judge.
And are you Ms. Preston?

MS. PRESTON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
All right.

And, Ms. Preston, you've

filed an appearance on this case?
MS. PRESTON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
All right.

This was the time set for

sentencing, and we have Mr. Pedockie present.
Did you get a copy of the presentence report?
MS. PRESTON:
THE COURT:

Yes, we did.
In fact, my recollection is this was

actually scheduled for sentencing a couple of weeks ago and
we set this over at your request; is thar right?
MS. PRESTON:
THE COURT:
MS. PRESTON:
THE COURT:
indicate, too —

That's correct.

Yes.

So you could go over the report?
Yes.
Before we get started, let me just

and I'll be glad to hear from both sides

but as I understand it, under the law this is a mandatory

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
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prison sentence.
Is that your understanding?
MS. PRESTON:

That's —

yes, that's our

understanding.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Is there any legal

reason why we shouldn't impose sentence?
MS. PRESTON:
THE COURT:

No, there is not.
All right.

Anything you want to say as

far as recommendations or comments?
MS. PRESTON:

Your Honor, I think the —

counsel's

advised me that the victim wants to address rhe Court, and
we'd like to reserve -- reserve our —
THE COURT:

our brief statement.

Do you want to hear from the victim

first?
MS. PRESTON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
All right.

All right.

Did the victim

want to be heard then?
MS. NEIDER:

She does, Judge.

She has a statement.

I don't know if she's going to read it or -THE COURT:

All right.

Did you want to come up,

Ma'am?
All right.

Again, would you give us your name?

MS. SATHER:

It's Jeanette Nicole Sather.

THE COURT:

Jeanette?

MS. SATHER:

Uh-huh.

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
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THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Go ahead, if you'd

like.
MS. SATHER:

I just want to take a few moments to

express how being the victim in this aggravated kidnapping
case has affected me and my life.
Every day I live with the fear that Pvobert has sent or
will send someone to retaliate against me for turning him in.
Because of this fear, I've put an alarm on my house and even
gone to the extent of trying to sell my home and move away
from Utah just to feel safe again.
My ability to trust men has suffered immensely and this
makes having a normal social life very difficult.

It's been

over two years and I still have nights that I don't sleep
because of the fear Robert's created in my life and the
nightmares I have of Robert and things he's done and said to
me.

I'm trying to work through some of these issues that

he's caused in my life, but there are many memories that will
not be able to -- that I will not be able to forget.
Robert has expressed to others that if he's sent to
prison because of what he did to me that he will kill me or
have someone else take care of or hurt me.
these threats are true.

I honestly feel

Robert has a strong history of

violence and I feel that he will follow through with these
threats.
I feel if Robert is ever allowed to return to the

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
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community, he will be violent again, if not towards me, to
someone.

And his next victim may not be as lucky as I and

get away.
Pxobert shot a man out of jealousy, kidnapped and almost
killed me out of obsession and jealousy.

I feel that he will

eventually kill someone because of these dangerous
personality traits.

Robert should be locked away from

society for a very long time so that he can be rehabilitated
so he will not hurt or kill anyone else.
Thank you for your time.
THE COURT:

All right.

what I said earlier?
mandatory.

And, Ma 1 am, you understand

Under the law, it's -- a prison term is

He can't get probation on this case.

MS. SATHER:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Even if I wanted to give him probation.

MS. SATHER:
THE COURT:
MS. SATHER:
THE COURT:

I understand.
Do you understand that?
Uh-huh.
Okay.

All right.

Thank you.

Did you want to make that part of the file then?
MS. SATHER:
THE COURT:

Yeah.
Okay.

All right.

And, Ms. Neider,

anything you wanted to add?
MS. NEIDER:

Judge, just briefly.

I know it's been

quite a while since we have been here on this case in terms

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
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of subst antive issues.
THE COURT:

Okay.
But I know the Court' s familiar with

MS. NEIDER:

the fact s of the case, but I think th at Ms . Sather is lucky
to be al ive.

And that this situation was a serious one,

Judge.
The choices for the Court --- and I know that the PSI is
not real ly specific .in terms of other than following the
statutor y language.
THE COURT : Well, isn't the report wrong?

It says

five to life •
MS. NEIDER:
THE COURT:

It says on the front page

—

As I read the statute, it says six, ten

or
MS. NEIDER:
THE COURT:

Fifteen.
—

MS. NEIDER:
or a fifteen.

fifteen.

Yeah.

That is true, Judge.

It is a six, ten,

And it's the State's position that -- that the

Court should sentence him to ten to life, consecutive to the
sentence that he's already serving down at the prison.
think that the prison —

I

that will give them the opportunity

to keep a handle on him for a very long period of time, which
I think is necessary.
The presumption is that it run consecutive because he
was on parole, and I think that's -- there's no reason to
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deviate from that in this case, especially considering rhat
he had only been on parole for about three and a half months.
It wasn't that he had had an extended period of time that he
had been behaving or anything like that.

He had been out for

a very short period of time, was adjusting, and I think went
off the deep end in a significant way when it came to this
case.

I think the only way the Court could justify running

anything concurrent would be to give him the 15 to -- 15 to
life, concurrent.

But it is the State's position that this

case warrants a ten to life, consecutive.
I think based on the history of this case that the
Court's so familiar with that Mr. Pedockie has never
expressed any remorse for what has happened.

He has never

apologized to the victim and I don't think he probably
intends to do that today.

He has been focused on working the

system, manipulating the Court, manipulating the —

the

county attorney's office, in an attempt to try and make this
go away.

And -- instead of standing up for what has happened

and really accepting responsibility for what he did that
20

night.

21

definitely counts against him.

22
23
24
25

He's never done that.

Judge, I think that that

So the State's position is the ten to life, consecutive,
and we would ask the Court to follow that.
THE COURT:
All right.

All right.

Thanks, Ms. Neider.

Anything from the defense then, Ms. Preston?

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
one

i c\ c; c;

1

MS. PRESTON:

2

THE COURT:

3

say or

We'll submit it, Your Honor.
Okay.

Anything Mr. Pedockie wants to

—

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

No.

All right.

Well, as I mentioned before,

6

it -- it seems clear to me under the statute that a prison

7

term is mandatory as I read 76-5-302.

8

indicates —

9

76-3-406 that it says essentially the same thing:

And it also

I think there was another section in the Code,
Probation

10

shall not be granted for a conviction for aggravated

11

kidnapping.

12

be entered for a lower category of offense.

13

hospitalization cannot be ordered under 76-3-406.

14

So I —

The sentence can't be suspended.

Judgment can't
And

I suppose the only real questions are whether it

15

be for a minimum of six, ten, or fifteen, and the other

16

question is whether or not it run concurrent or consecutive.

17

So I think based on the evidence that I've heard and the

18

arguments presented, Mr. Pedockie, it will be the sentence of

19

the Court then on the charge of aggravated kidnapping, a

20

first degree felony, that you serve a minimum of ten years,

21

not less than life.

22

I'm going to base the ten-year minimum on the fact that

23

a gun was used.

I realize you didn't pull the trigger when

24

the gun was fired, but as Ms. Neider pointed out, this victim

25

is —

is so lucky to be alive.

I mean, anyone who saw the
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photographs, I mean, that bullet goes right through the back
of uhe pickup, goes right through the seat where she's
sitting, and how it ever missed her, it's just a miracle.
But I think the fact that a firearm was used, and then I
believe there was evidence that you had threatened her on
several different occasions.

You told her, you're dead; or

if you don't go with me, you're going to be killed.

I think

there was some evidence about a knife, maybe a pocket knife
being used or displayed, too.
And I think for those reasons, the fact that the gun was
used and there was threats made to her life, that the minimum
of ten years is appropriate in this case.
I am going to run this sentence consecutive, however,
with the time you're already doing at the Utah State Prison.
You —

you hadn't been out of —

long when this occurred.

or off —

out of prison very

And so, obviously, you —

you

hadn't learned anything, I guess, from the last time you were
there at the prison.

So I'll run this sentence consecutive

with the one you're already doing on the other offense.
I'm also going to recommend that you be required to pay
restitution for all expenses incurred as a result of this
offense to the Office of Victim Reparation and for any
out-of-pocket expenses that may have been incurred by the
victim on this case for therapy.
And I believe that's it.

Anything else?

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
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MS. NEIDER:
THE COURT:

No, Judge.
Anything else from the defense?

MS. PRESTON:
to address.

Your Honor, I just have a brief thing

Mr. Pedockie's requested that -- he requested

transcripts for every proceeding that's -- not the trial
transcripts, but all the other ones.
THE COURT:

Right.

MS. PRESTON:

And —

a couple of months ago and he

hasn't received those.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. PRESTON:

And he plans to file a motion for a

new trial, and so we need to have that expedited.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

I think if you'll

just contact the court reporters, they can make arrangements
and get you the transcripts for all the hearings.
MS. PRESTON:

Okay.

THE COURT:

All right.

THE CLERK:

Credit for time served?

THE COURT:

Yeah.

We'll give him credit for time

served,
MS. PRESTON:
THE COURT:
MS. NEIDER:
THE COURT:

Okay?

Thank you, Your Honor.
All right.

Thank you.

Thank you, Judge.
Thank you.

(Proceedings conclude.)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This is Srate of Utah versus Robert

Pedockie, it's case 0689.
And, Mr. Laker, you're here on his behalf?
MR. LAKER:

I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And Ms. Beaton —

or Mr. Daines for the

State, for both of you?
MR. LAKER:

They 1 re here anyway.

THE COURT:

They're here.

All right.

The reason I

put this on the calendar is I think sentencing was actually
set out a couple of weeks from now, but Mr. Pedockie sent us
a letter indicating he wasn't willing to waive the 45 days
and so I just asked my clerk to bring him up because he's
entitled to be sentenced within 4 5 days.

And I know,

Mr. Laker, you have not had a chance to respond to the
Stare's brief.
MR. LAKER:

That's correct, Your Honor.

I just

—

in fact, I only saw it yesterday, last evening after -•THE COURT:

So I guess the question is, does

Mr. Pedockie want to be sentenced today or does he want to
waive the 4 5 days now, give you a chance to respond to the
State's brief and have us put sentencing on another date?
MR. LAKER:

Your Honor, I need to tell the Court

that Mr. Pedockie has indicated to me that he has intention
of hiring -- to handle the appeal of this case

—

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. LAKER:

-- private counsel and thai he has

reiterated to me that he doesn't want either myself or
Mr. Barr to be representing him.
particular point in time.

That's all I know at this

I know that I have not filed a

response to the brief that was submitted by the prosecution.
As I indicated, I only received that -- it was mailed on the
26th.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. LAKER:

But we received it a couple of days

after that, I believe.
THE COURT:

Well, I guess what I need to know,

though, the answer to my question is, does he want to be
sentenced today?

Because under the law he has a right to be

sentenced within 45 days.

I got a letter from him saying he

wasn't willing to waive that.
MR. LAKER:

I guess I need to know --

I think he's going to have to answer

that question -THE COURT:

Mr. Pedockie, did you want

MR. LAKER:

-- your Honor, because I can't for him.

THE DEFENDANT:

—

I just want it on my record that I

want all my transcripts, videotapes, and mental health
transcripts, everything I've asked Mr. Barr and I told you
before the trial even started that these individuals weren't
speaking in my behalf, that I actually wanted to fire them

4

and you made me proceed with these individuals, that I have a
conflict of interest -THE COURT:

Okay.

THE DEFENDANT:

—

in already.

even want him to speak in my behalf.

So, yeah, I don't

1 just want all my

transcripts from day one, from the rest, all the way and
video cameras of the trial and everything like that.

I've

asked several times and I have not gotten any response or any
response from any of the -THE COURT:

Well, see, you don't have to worry about

it until once your sentenced, then you've got 30 days to file
your appeal.

The time doesn't run until after you're

sentence so that's where we're at right now.
THE DEFENDANT:

Well, let's get it going so I can

get the appeal on the way.
THE COURT:

Well, that's what I want to know is that

under the law you have
THE DEFENDANT:

—
And you guys violated my

constitutional rights and I want to be sentenced.

I asked to

be sentenced the day of trial when it was over and I don't
even know why you proceeded to let these individuals to talk
in my behalf.
THE COURT:

So you want to be sentenced today?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, I do.

Okay.

The State want to be heard?

I

5

know we originally were thinking about that and then you said
you wanted to brief it.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I've got ,your brief.
Your Honor, I also --

Do you want to proceed with sentencing

today?
MS. BEATON:

We're fine with sentencing today.

THE DEFENDANT:

Your Honor, I also want a copy of

the sentencing today too.
THE COURT:

That's why we have the court reporter

here so -THE DEFENDANT:

No.

I want a copy of the —

because

I want to show vindictiveness of how she's trying to up the
ante on this which is violating my other rights for appeal.
THE COURT:

All right.

Did you get a copy of the

presentence report, Mr. Laker?
MR. LAKER:

I did not, YTour Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. LAKER:

I think that went to —

probably went to

Mr. Barr.
THE COURT:

Oh, okay.

MR. LAKER:

And I just want -- for clarification, I

think Mr. Pedockie does not want me to speak in his behalf in
any way, shape or form.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And I've heard that but I'm not

going to release you at this point.

6

the case

MR. LAKER:

But I don't know whether I shou Id speak.

THE COURT:

Well , as far as I know, you're still on

So do you need some time to go over this

presentence report with Mr. Pedockie?
MR. LAKER:

Yes, Your Honor, because I haven't yet.

THE COURT:

Do y ou want to t ake this one?

MR. LAKER:

May I take that one?

THE COURT:

All right.

Let' s pass this for just a

minute so you can 1 ook at the report, Mr. Laker.
(A recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

All right.

Let1 s have the record-

reflect that both parties are here.
Mr. Lake.r, any legal reason we shouldn't impose sentence?
MR. LAKER:

No, Your Honor.

Given the

representations he' s made. here today, he wants to go forward
with sentencing.
MS. BEATON:

Well, maybe, your Honor, if I could

just speak to that one issue for just one second.
THE COURT:

All right.

MS. BEATON:

The story I had originally heard was

that the deferidant was planning on hiring Gr eg Skordas to
handle the sentencing.

When it was quarter after three and I

didn t see Mr. Skordas,r I ca.lle<d his office to find out if he
was coming because Mr. Laker to Id me that Mr*. Pedockie said
that s who he had hired.

7

THE DEFENDANT:
MR. LAKER:

I didn't say that.

That's not what I said. , I said that he

intends to hire him to handle the -- if it proceeds
forward -- from this point forward and then he did not want
us, Mr. Barr and myself, to represent him.
THE COURT:

I guess the question is, does he want

him here for sentencing or does he just, want him on on appeal
or do we know?
MR. LAKER:

I think he just wants him here on the

appeal.
MS. BEATON:

Well, even as to the appeal I talked to

him about that because I -- because his name keeps creeping
into this case on a regular basis, and during the trial he
indicated that Mr. Skordas was going to come up and represent
him pro bono.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Right.
I've never spoken with Mr. Skordas with

regard to that because I obviously had other things to do
while we were in the middle of the trial, but I asked him
today whether or not that was the case and he said that the
defendant's family had contacted him, he has never been
retained as counsel to handle the trial.

He said he did have

a conversation with them that indicated that if the trial was
set, he knew from previous dealings with you that you would
not be inclined to continue the trial but they said they

1

never retained him anyway.

I asked Mr. Skordas whether or

2

not he would have been willing to do it on a pro bono basis

3

because that was the representation we had from the defendant

4

during the course of the trial, and he said absolutely not.

5

I then asked him whether or not he had been retained to

6

handle the sentencing today.

He said no.

He said he had

7

been contacted again and they wanted to know whether or not

8

he would handle the appeal.

9

contacted once a while back, has never been contacted again

He said that he has been

10

by the family and he has not been retained.

11

intention on entering on behalf of this defendant.

12

MR. LAKER:

13

MS. BEATON:

14

He has no

At least at this point.
Well, I didn't get that impression, but

all right.

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. BEATON:

All right.

Okay.

And I guess the only issue that

17

Mr. Daines and I have with this is I agree if the defendant

18

wants to be sentenced today.

19

at the trial, has the ability to say I want to proceed on my

20

own or if he thinks that he wants to have an attorney

21

represent him and he wants to retain somebody, we think he

22

has that right, but obviously it can't be done today because

23

he has not retained counsel.

24

Mr. Laker to represent him on the sentencing, although it

25

might be in his best interest, we think the defendant still

I think that he, like he does

But in terms of forcing

1

ha.3 a Sixth Amendment right if he wants to go on his own as

2

to sentencing, we can't force that

3

Now, I guess the Court corild concej_vably h ear from

4

Mr . Pedockie about sentencing and then if for fun we wanted

5

to hear what Mr. Laker had to say, not necessarily speaking

6

on the defendant's behalf, but. just as sort of an added

7

bonus, we could do that.

8
9

THE COURT:

For fun?

I ! m sorry.

All right.

Well,

I guess we just need to know, Mr. Pedockie, do you just want

10

to go forward today with sentencing or do you want to talk to

11

a private attorney first?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

I want to be sentenced today but I

13

don't think it is any of the prosecutor's business what, how

14

or who I'm going to obtain for a legal counsel and what my

15

family's done, you know what I mean?

16

THE COURT:

All right.

I just think if he wants to

17

be sentenced, that's what the law says, he can be sentenced

18

within 45 days, so let's go ahead.and go through with it.

19

just want to make sure I've got it clear on the record that

20

that's what he wants do.

21
22
23

THE DEFENDANT:

Because, Your Honor, what she said

is not true, that's why I don't think
MS. BEATON:

I

—

Mr. Skordas said he was available by

24

telephone if the Court wanted to put him on a telephone

25

conference call as well.
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THE DEFENDANT:

Because me and my dad was going to

sit down -- .1 didn't even know we had court today and roday
was the day we were going to talk to see if we were going to
retain him.
THE COURT:

And that's why the question.

want to talk to Mr. Skordas
THE DEFENDANT:

Do you

—

I want to be sentenced.

I was

wanting to be sentenced before, the day of trial -THE COURT:

I know.

THE DEFENDANT:

I didn't even want to continue it.

You guys already violated —

I wanted to be sentenced that

day.
THE COURT:
in 45 days.

Well, you have the right to be sentenced

You don't necessarily have a right to be

sentenced on the day you were convicted.
THE DEFENDANT:

I want to be sentenced within 4 5

days .
THE COURT:
now.

Okay.

And that's where we're at right

So you don't want to talk to Mr. Skordas and you don't

want to talk to somebody else before sentencing, right?
THE DEFENDANT:

My phone at the prison aren't even

working now due to the fact that —

I believe it's due to the

fact that the prosecutor keeps messing around with it and
listening to it because my phones won't even accept ~THE COURT:

That's not my question.

The question is

11

you don't want to talk to Mr. Skordas or another attorney?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
clear record then.
All right.

I just want to be sentenced.

Okay.

All right.

I -chink we've made a

Okay.

Mr. Laker, any legal reason sentence should

not be imposed?
MR. LAKER:

Not on a legal basis.

THE COURT:

Do you have anything you want to say on

his behalf?
MR. LAKER:

Only, Your Honor, that the

recommendation is pretty much identical to what it was
previously.
THE COURT:

Which was the wrong recommendation.

It

was a five to life, which doesn't apply to this case.
MR. LAKER:

It doesn't apply.

THE COURT:

Which make me wonder if AP&P doesn't

just pick up their old presentence report and run it off.
MR. LAKER:

The only thing I would say and I only

say this intentionally is that that I —

I don't think the —

that there have been additional facts presented that would
justify increasing it, and with that I'll -THE COURT:
want to say?
All right.

All right.

Mr. Pedockie, anything you

I take it that's a no?
Ms. Beaton?

THE DEFENDANT:

No.

I —

just like I said, I don't

12

trust these attorneys and I would like to have an attorney
but I want to be sentenced so I can get this on the road.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

State want to be

heard, Ms. Beaton?
MS. BEATON:

We do, Your Honor.

You had already

indicated that you received the State's sentencing brief.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

I have.
The issue before the Court today is

whether or not this ought to be a 6, 10 or 15 commitment and
whether or not that charge should run consecutive or
concurrent to the current sentence that the defendant is
already serving at the Utah State Prison.
At this point, it is the State's position, as I'm sure
you've read, that the State believes that the sentence should
be 15 to life to run consecutive to the sentence that he has
now.

I'm speaking on behalf of the State of Utah, I'm

speaking on behalf of the Ogden City police department who
investigated this case, and certainly I'm speaking on behalf
of the victim in this case, Nicole Sather.
I also had a conversation with Ms. Neider who was here,
and although she's not with the county attorney's office
anymore, I indicated to her what our position was.

She has

been aware of the fact that we think there was an error early
on when this was originally sentenced.

And she had indicated

that it was fine with her if I indicated to the Court that
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she does, in fact, think that the appropriate sentence as
well would be 15 to life consecutive, given the nature of the
facts of this particular case, given the history that this
defendant has, and given the nature of who this defendant is
and in weighing the aggravating versus the mitigating
factors.
Now, the law ordinarily says that you can't impose an
increased sentence and I know that was a concern that the
Court had initially when we dealt with this.

I've provided

i

the Court a copy of the statute that governs this particular
issue.

If the Court looks at the additional 16 factors that

the State has presented for you and you conclude at the end
of the day that, one, you think those factors are aggravating
in this particular case; and two, you think those are factors
that you did not know when you originally sentenced this
defendant in 2003, you have uhe ability at this point in time
to impose the 15 to life.
Now, the issue as to whether or not it runs concurrent or
consecutive, it is the State's position that that
determination has been made and it was accurately made the
first time.

The defendant was on parole and had only been on

parole for approximately three and a half months before he
did this.

In fact, that would be an aggravating factor that

the Court could have considered in determining whether the
medium level is imposed which would be the 10 to life or the

14

aggravated level in which it would be imposed at the 15 to
life.
I'm not going to reiterate all of the aggravating factors
but I have listed out the aggravating factors that I believe
the Court to have known in 2003.

The State was only able to

come up with two mitigating factors that you knew of in 2003
which the State's conclusion is, is that the aggravating
factors in 2003 far outweigh the mitigating factors in 2003,
but then we've also given you more details about what was
going on, because some of you it you heard during the course
of the second trial, some of you didn't know about it because
adult probation and parole didn't tell you about it or
Ms. Neider didn't discuss it with you in any further detail.
But at this point in time, you have a copy of the crime that
the defendant had been committed to the Utah State Prison
with.
The defendant at this point in time now qualifies as a
habitual violent offender where he did go out and commit any
other sort of violent offense.

And certainly the nature of

the violent offense that the defendant had been committed on
and had been on parole on at the time that he committed this
crime in 2001, the State certainly thinks is an aggravating
factor that the Court should have known more about when you
sentenced him in 2003 in which we've certainly given you
ample indication of what was going on in 2007 because I
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actually provided both you and defense counsel a copy of the
police reports that talked about that.
I also drew the conclusion that there were similarities
between those two particular crimes indicating that the
defendant is not only a repeat offender in this type of
type of type —

—

this similar type of crime, but also

demonstrated the similarity in these two different types of
crimes that were going on, and then the State went on to
describe other factors totaling 16 different factors that we
think that you and ultimately the Board of Pardons ought to
consider when you determine when the defendant ought to be
released on this crime.
Certainly it is the State's position that this defendant
is a danger to the community, the type of crime he committed
is the type that ordinarily he ought to be sentenced to a 15
to life, and we would ask that that be the sentence that you
impose today.
THE COURT:

Ms. Beaton, does the victim want to be

heard today at the time of sentencing?
MS. BEATON:

She had indicated to me today that she

knows that you had the ability to listen to what she said in
2003 and you also got to hear what she testified to at trial
that we had in 2007, she wanted

— assuming that you remember

the comments that she made at that time, and fully realizing
that she!s supportive of the State ' s position that the
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defendant be sentenced at the 15 to life consecutive, those
are the things she wanted you to know and she didn't think it
was necessary to speak again today.
THE COURT:

All right.

I might indicate I did have

a chance to go back and look at the transcript for
sentencing.

In fact, I think it was part of your exhibit was

the sentencing, so that kind of helped me remember what was
said at the time of sentencing both by the victim, defendant,
and also the prosecutor, Ms. Neider, so that was very helpful
to be able to see what information was provided at the time
of sentencing.
You know, this is a difficult call, because as I read the
statute, the defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping
and he was sentenced to 10 to life and that sentence was
consecutive.
2003.

I imposed that sentence on February the 12th of

Ultimately the conviction was overturned by the

Supreme Court and it was sent back for a retrial.

He was

convicted again on February the 20th of 2007, then, of
course, the issue then became could I increase the sentence
from 10 to life up to 15 to life.

And I think the statute

that applies here, of course, is 76-3-405 and the general
rule is pretty well known and that's the one I relied upon
which was that you may not -- a judge may not increase the
sentence on a retrial.

You can impose a more severe

sentence -- because what it appears to be on the surface is
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that if I increase the sentence that somehow I'm being
vindictive because he appealed his conviction.
The only exception in there is if there are facts that
were not known to the Court at the time of the original
sentence, and that's what I'm struggling with is trying to
decide whether or not I knew or had access to facts at this
sentence that I did not have at the time of the original
sentence.

And I just want to maybe just take a minute and go

through some of the facts, the aggravating factors.
One of the facts that the State raised was that I now had
more of the details of what happened on his mayhem charge,
the one that occurred in January of 1990 where he shot a man
in the leg and I guess ultimately the man's leg had to be
amputated and it had to do with a woman.

Very similar to

this situation, apparently he was jealous and got mad at this
guy and shot him in the leg and bashed in the windows of her
car.

But what I do recall, and I wrote it down, is when I

looked at the transcript and that was that the victim,
Ms. Sather, had talked about that at the time of the original
sentencing.

She may not have given us the same details that

we had now, but there certainly —

I knew about the fact that

he had a prior conviction, I knew generally what that
conviction involved, the mayhem charge in 1990.

So I'm not

sure that's a new -- a new fact, something that I was not
aware of.
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The other aggravating factors that you talk about are the
tampering with the witness where Nicole was threatened in
January of 2001, the threats that were made to Justin
Pedockie and Zach Leifson, it appears that that seems to be
kind of a never-ending battle.
As I recall in the first trial, all of these people
mentioned they had been threatened.

And again, in 2007 when

we do the second trial, again the victims had been
threatened.

The problem I'm having is trying to link that to

the defendant.

There's no question somebody's calling,

somebody is contacting witnesses and telling them not to
testify, but I don't know if this is just a friend or a
relative that is just doing this on their own, or whether
Mr. Pedockie put them up to it.

But from what I gather, I

don't remember anybody ever saying that it was Mr. Pedockie
who actually called and threatened.

In fact, I think Nicole

was threatened by a guy named Paul Bushell according to my
notes.

So, again, I'm having trouble saying that this is a

new fact that is attributed —

it certainly would benefit

Mr. Pedockie if he was able to convince witnesses not to
testify, but I don't know that he actually did that.
The other aggravating factor was the recantation by Zach
Leifson on April 19th of 2002.

Again, that's before he was

ever sentenced on the first case, so again, I'm not sure
that's new evidence, something new and different to increase
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the penalties.
The one^ thing uhat was new was the sham marriage, I
guess, as referred to by the State by Karen where she was
going to be a witness and then they hurried and got married
so the State couldn't call her, but she never testified.

So

I don't know even if that marriage is a sham, I don't know
that it made any difference other than it just shows the type
of person we're dealing with.

But since the jury never got

to hear her testimony, I don't know if it makes any
difference whether or not they got married and for what
reason.

So, again, I don't think that was important.

The fire that occurred at the victim's home.

I did know

about the fire at the time of the original sentence which
occurred in November of 2002 and he wasn't sentenced until
2003.

So, again, I just don't think that's a new —

a new

fact that I could consider.
And, finally, one of the things the State talks about is
the defendant's ability to try to manipulate the court
system, about, you know, he keeps firing lawyers, hiring new
lawyers , refusing to answer que stions, fa king illness, trying
to dela y the trial, again it 's just been a continuing episode
by him.

I mean, it happened in the first trial, it happened

in the second trial, but, ag ain , I don 't know that it s
really new evidence so

—

I guess what I'm saying is after I consider everything,
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I'm just rlot sure that all c)f this is new evidence that would
.justify the Court increasingf the sent ence to 15 to life.

So

I'm going to deny the State' s request
As I say, tha t's a closei call , it really is, I ! ve ti-tought
about this5 for a long time.

But I'll just impose the

original sentence which was 10 to lif e and commitment wi.11 be
forthwith.

I do think we can not ify the Board of Pardons.

Certainly all of this would be re levant on the que stion of
when he's paroled •
Anything else ?

That will be the sentence

—

THE CLERK:

Credit for time served?

THE COURT:

No.

THE CLERK:

So no credit?

THE COURT:

No credit for time served.

MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Not from me, no.

And it!s consecutive?
It's consecutive.

Uh-huh.

All right?

Any other questions?
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

I think there was a restitution amount.
Oh, there was a restitution.

require that he be responsible for restitution.
show an amount here.

Do you?

And I will
But I don't

So this would be all

restitution incurred by the victim in the case.
MS. BEATON:

$408.92 was paid by the Victim's

Reparations Fund.
THE COURT:

All right.

Is that the only figure that
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you're aware of 408?
(Ms. Beaton consults with the victim.)
MS. BEATON:

She's talking about time lost from work

as a result of being here.
THE COURT:

I don't know, can you recover that?

I

know you couldn't at one time.

can.

MR. LAKER:

I still don't think you can.

THE COURT:

I wish we could but I don't think we

All right.

That will be the order then.

THE DEFENDANT:

Your Honor, can I get a copy of the

sentencing paper today?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Just contact the clerk and

they'll get it to you.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
today

Can I get a copy today so I can

You understand you've got 30 days from

—
THE DEFENDANT:

appealing this right now.
THE COURT:

—

Yes.

I want it on record I am

I want it on record right now.

It is.

It's on the record.

(The matter concluded.)
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